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ABSTRACT
This paper tries to reconcile evidence from the mi.croeconometric and empirical macro growth
literatures on the effect of schooling on income and GDP growth. Much microeconometric evidence suggest
that education is an important causal determinant of income for individuals within countries. At a national
level., however, recent studies have found that increases in educational attainment are unrelated to economic
growth. This finding appears to be a spurious result of the extremely high rate of measurement error in first-
differenced cross-country education data. After accounting for measurement error, the effect of changes in
educational attainment on income growth in cross-country data is at least as great as microeconometric
estimates of the rate of return to years of schooling. Another finding of the macro growth literature -that
economic growth depends positively on the initial stock of human capital -isshown to result from imposing
linearity and constant-coefficient assumptions on the estimates. These restrictions are often rejected by the
data, and once either assumption is relaxed the initial level of education has little effect on economic growth
for the average country.
Alan B. Krueger Mikael Lindahl
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and NBER1. Introduction
Interest in the rate of return to investment in education has been sparkedby two
independent developments in economic research in the 1990s. On the one hand, the micro labor
literature has produced several new estimates of the monetary return toschooling that exploit
natural experiments in which variability in workers' schooling attainment wasgenerated by some
exogenous and arguably random force, such as quirks in compulsory schooling laws or students'
proximity to a college. On the other hand, the macro growth literature has investigated whether
the level of schooling in a cross-section of countries is related to the countries'subsequent (JDP
growth rate. This paper summarizes and tries to reconcile these two disparate but related lines
of research.
The next section reviews the theoretical and empirical foundations of the Mincerian human
capital earnings function. Our survey of the literature indicates that Mincer's (1974) formulation
of the log-linear earnings-education relationship fits the data rather well. Each additionalyear of
schooling appears to raise earnings by about 10 percent in the United States, although the rate of
return to education varies over time as well as across countries. There issurprisingly lithe
evidence that omitted variables (e.g., inherent ability) that might be correlated withearnings and
education cause simple OLS estimates of wage equations to significantlyoverstate the return to
education. Indeed, consistent with Griiches 's (1977) conclusion, much of the modemliterature
finds that the upward "ability bias" is of about the same order ofmagnitude as the downward bias
caused by measurement error in educational attainment.
Section 3 considers the empirical macro growth literature. First,we relate the Mincerian
wage equation to the macro growth model. The Mincer model implies that the change in a
country's avenge level of schooling should be the key determinant of incomegrowth. The macro2
growth literature, by contrast, typically specifies growth as a function of the initial level of
education. Moreover, we show that if the return to education changesover time (e.g., because
of exogenous skill-biased technological change), the macro growth modelsare unidentified. Much
of the empirical growth literature has eschewed the Mincer model because studiessuch as
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) fmd that the change in education is nota determinant of economic
growth.' We show, however, that Benhabib and Spiegel's finding that increases in educationare
unrelated to economic growth results because there is virtually no signal in the education datathey
use, conditional on the growth of capital.
In contrast to the micro education literature, the macro growth literature has devotedonly
cursory attention to potential problems caused by measurement errors in education. Despite their
aggregate nature, available data on average schooling levels across countries are poorly measured,
in large part because they are often derived from enrollment flows. Thereliability of country-
level education data is no higher than the reliability of individual-level educationdata. For
example, the correlation between Barro and Lee's (1991) and Kyriacou's (1991) measures of
average education across 68 countries in 1985 is 0.86, and the correlation between the changein
schooling between 1965 and 1985 from these two sources is only 0.34. Additional estimates of
the reliability of country-level education data based on our analysis ofcomparable micro thta from
the World Values Survey for 34 countries suggests that measurementerror is particularly
prevalent for secondary and higher schooling. The measurement errors in schooling arepositively
correlated over time, but not as highly correlated as trueyears of schooling. We find that
'There are also notable exceptiom that have embraced the Mincermodel, such as Hall and Jones (1998) and
Kienow and Rodriguez-Dare (1997).3
measurement errors in education severely attenuate estimates of the effect of the change in
schooling on GDP growth. Nonetheless, we show that measurement errors in schooling are
unlikely to cause a spurious positive association between the initial level of schooling and GDP
growth across countries, conditional on the change in education. Thus, like Topel (1999),we
conclude that both the change and initial level of education are positively correlated with economic
growth.
Finally, we explore whether the significant effect of the initial level of schooling on growth
continues to hold if several restrictive assumptions in the growth equationare relaxed. For
example, we estimate a variable-coefficient model that allows the coefficient on education tovary
across countries (as is found in the micro data), and we relax the linearity assumption of the initial
level of education. These extensions show that the positive effect of the initial level of education
on economic growth is sensitive to econometric restrictions that are rejected by the data.
Our main conclusion is that while support for the micro Mincerianwage equation is
strong, the evidence of a positive effect of the stock of education on a country's growth rate is
tenuous. Even if one accepts the strong assumptions necessary to interpret the coefficienton the
initial level of education in cross-country growth regressions as identif'ing externalitiesfrom
education, the results most likely do not apply to the OECD countries, or to theaverage country
in the world: the positive effect of the initial level of education appliesprimarily to countries with
very low levels of education.
2. The Microeconomjcs of the Private Return to Education
Since at least the beginning of the century, economists and other social scientistshave4
sought to estimate the economic rewards individuals and society gain from completinghigher
levels of schooling.2 It has long been recognized that workers who attended schoollonger may
possess other characteristics that would lead them to earn higher wages irrespective of their level
of education. If these other characteristics are not accounted for, thensimple comparisons of
earnings across individuals with different levels of schooling would overstate the returnto
education. Early attempts to control for this "ability bias" included theanalysis of data on siblings
to difference-out unobserved family characteristics (e.g., Gorseline, 1932), andregression
analyses which included as control variables observed characteristics such as IQ andparental
education (e.g., Griiches and Mason, 1972). This literature isthorougffly surveyed in Griliches
(1977), Rosen (1977), Willis (1986), and Card (1999). We briefly review evidenceon the
Mincerian earnings equation, emphasizing recent studies thatexploit exogenous variations in
education in their estimation.
2.1 The Mincerian wage equation
Mincer (1974) showed that if the only cost of attending schoolan additional year is the
opportunity cost of students' time, and if the proportional increase in earnings causedby this
additional schooling is constant over the lifetime, then thelog of earnings would be linearly
related to individuals' years of schooling, and the slope of thisrelationship could be interpreted
as the rate of return to investment in schooling .Heaugmented this model to include a quadratic
2Early references are Gorseline (1932), Walsh (1935), Miller (1955), and Wolfie and Smith(1956).
3This insight is also in Becker (1964) and Becker and Chiswick(1966), who specify the cost of investment in
human capital as a fraction of earnings that would have been received in the absence ofthe investment. There are,
of course, other theoretical models that yield a log-linearearnings-schooling relationship. For example, if the5
termin work experience to allow for returns to on-the-job training,yielding the familiar
Mincerian wage equation:
(1) lnW=P0+p1S+p2x1÷p3x12+€.,
where In W is the natural log of the wage for individual i, Si isyears of schooling, X isexper-
ience, X2 is experience squared, andisa disturbance term. With Mincer's assumptions, the
coefficient on schooling,equalsthe discount rate, because schooling decisions are made by
equating two present value earnings streams: one with a higher level of schooling and one with
a lower level. An attractive feature of Mincer's model is that time spent in school (asopposed
to degrees) is the key determinant of earnings, so data onyears of schooling can be used to
estimate a comparable return to education in countries withvery different educational systems.
Equation (1) has been estimated for most countries of the world by OLS,andthe results
generally yield estimates of I31rangingfrom .05 to .15, with slightly larger estimates for women
than men (see Psacharopoulos, 1994). The log-linear relationship alsoprovides a good fit to the
data, as is illustrated by the plots for the U.S., Sweden, West Germany, and EastGermany in
Figure i. These figures display the coefficient on dummy variables indicating eachyear of
schooling, controlling for experience and gender, as well as the OLS estimate of the Mincerian
return. It is apparent that the semi-log specification provides a good description of the dataeven
production function relating earnings and human capital is log-linear, and individuals randomly choose theirschooling
level (e.g., optimization errors), then estimation of equation (1) would uncover the educationalproduction function.
4The German figures are from Krueger and Pischke (1995). The American andSwedish figures are based on the
authors' calculations using the 1991 March Current Population Survey and 1991 Swedish Levelof Living Survey.
The regressions also include controls for a quadratic in experience andsex.6
in countries with dramatically different economic and educationalsystems .
Muchresearch has addressed the question of how to interpret the educationslope in
equation (1). Does it reflect unobserved ability and other characteristics that are correlated with
education, or the true reward that the labor market places on education? Is education rewarded
because it is a signal of ability (Spence, 1973), or because it Increases productivecapabilities
(Becker, 1964)? Is the social return to education higher or lower than the coefficient on education
in the Mincerian wage equation? Would all individualsreap the same proportionate increase in
their earnings from attending school an extrayear, or does the return to education vary
systematically with individual characteristics? Definitive answers to these questions are not
available, although the weight of the evidence clearly suggests that education is notmerely a
proxy for unobserved ability. For example, Griliches (1977) concludes that instead of finding the
expected positive ability bias in the return to education, 'The implied net bias is either nilor
negative" once measurement error in education is taken into account.
The more recent evidence from natural experiments alsosupports a conclusion that omitted
ability does not cause upward bias the return to education (see Card, 1999 for asurvey). For
example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) observe that the combined effect of school startage cutoffs
and compulsory schooling laws produces a natural experiment, in which individualswho are born
on different days of the year start school at different ages, and then reach thecompulsory
5Evaluating micro data for states over time in the U.S., Card and Krueger (1992) fmd that theearnings-schooling
relationship is flat until the education level reached by the 2nd percentile of the education distribution, and then
becomes log-linear. There is also some evidence of sheep-skin effects aroundcollege and high school completion
(e.g., Park, 1994). Although statistical tests often reject the log-linear relationship for a largesample, the figures
clearly show that the log-linear relationship provides a good approximation to the functional form. It should alsobe
noted that Murphy and Welch (1990) find that a quartic in experience provides a better fitto the data than a quadratic.7
schooling age at different grade levels. If the date of the year individuals are born is unrelated
to their inherent abilities, then, in essence, variations in schooling associated withdate of birth
provide a natural experiment for estimating the benefit of obtaining extraschooling in response
to compulsory schooling laws. Using a sample of nearly one million observationsfrom the U.S.
Censuses, Angrist and Krueger fmd that men born in the beginning of the calendaryear, who start
school at a relatively older age and can dropout in a lowergrade, tend to obtain less schooling.
This pattern onlyholds for those with a high school educationor less, consistent with the view
that compulsory schooling is responsible for the pattern.They further find that the pattern of
education by quarter-of-birth is mirrored by the pattern ofearnings by quarter-of-birth: in
particular, individuals who are born early in the year tend to earn less, on average.6 Instrumental
variables (IV) estimates that are identified by variability inschooling associated with quarter-of-
birth suggest that the payoff to education is slightly higher than the OLS estimate.7Angrist and
Krueger conclude that the upward bias in the return to schooling is about thesame order of
magnitude as the downward bias due to measurement error in schooling.
Other studies have used a variety of other sources ofarguably exogenous variability in
schooling to estimate the return to schooling. Harmon and Walker (1995), forexample, more
directly examine the effect of compulsory schooling by studying the effect ofchanges in the
compulsory schooling age in the United Kingdom, while Card (1995a) exploits variations in
6Again, no such pattern holds for college graduates.
7Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) argue that Angrist and Krueger's IV estimatesare biased toward the OLS
estimates because of weak instruments. However, Staiger and Stock(1997), Donald and Newey (1997), Angrist,
Inibens and Krueger (1999), and Chamberlain and Imbens (1996) show that weakinstruments do not account for the
central conclusion of Angrist and Krueger (1991).8
schooling attainment owing to families' proximity to a college in the U.S. Duflo(1998) uses
variation in educational attainment related to school buildingprograms across islands in Indonesia.
These three papers find that the IV estimates of the return to education thatexploit a "natural
experiment" for variability in education exceed the corresponding OLS estimates,although the
difference between the IV and OLS estimates often is not statisticallysignificant. Ashenfelter,
Harmon and Oosterbeek (1999) compile estimates from 27 studies, and find that theconventional
OLS return to schooling is .066, on average, whereas theaverage IV estimate is .093.
We interpret this evidence as suggesting that the return to an additionalyear of education
obtained for reasons like compulsory schooling or school-buildingprojects is more likely to be
greater, than lower, than the conventionally-estimated return to schooling. Because the schooling
levels of individuals who are from more disadvantaged backgrounds tend to be those whoare most
affected by the interventions examined in the literature, Lang (1993) and Card(1 995b) have
inferred that the return to an additional year of schooling ishigher for individuals from
disadvantaged families than for those from advantaged families, andsuggest that such a result
follows because disadvantaged individuals have higher discount rates.
Other related evidence for the U.S. suggests the payoff to investments in educationare
higher for more disadvantaged individuals. First, while studies of the effect of schoolresources
on student outcomes yield mixed results, there is a tendency to find more beneficial effects of
school resources for disadvantaged students (see, for example, Summers andWolfe, 1977,
Krueger, 1999 and Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 1998). Second, evidencesuggests that pre-school
8Ashenfelter, 1-Jannon and Oosterbeek explore whether publication bias accounts for thetendancy of IV estimates
to exceed the OLS estimates. After adjusting for selection bias, however, they still fmd that thereturn is higher, on
average, in the IV estimates than in the OLS estimates (.081 versus .064).9
programs have particularly large, long-term effects for disadvantaged children in terms of
reducing crime and welfare dependence, and raising incomes (see, Barnett, 1992). Third, several
studies have found that students from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds makeequivalent
gains on standardized tests during the school year, but children from disadvantaged backgrounds
fall behind during the summer while children from advantaged backgroundsmove ahead (see
Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson, 1997). And fourth, evidence suggests that college students from
more disadvantaged families benefit more from attending elite colleges than do students from
advantaged families (see Dale and Krueger, 1998).
It is unclear whether this evidence of a higher return to human capital fordisadvantaged
students applies outside the U.S. But in all regions of the world,Psacharopolous (1994)
concludes that there is a higher return to primary schooling than tosecondary or tertiary
schooling, which also suggests that disadvantaged children benefit more from additional human
capital investments.
2.2 Social versus Private Returns to Education
The social return to education can, of course, be higher or lower than theprivate return.
The social return can be higher because of externalities from education, which couldoccur, for
example, if higher education leads to technological progress that is not captured in the private
return to that education, or if more education produces positive externalities, suchas a reduction
in crime and welfare participation, or more informed political decisions. The formeris more
likely if human capital is expanded at higher levels of education while the latter ismore likely if
it is expanded at lower levels. It is also possible that the socialreturn to education is less than the10
private return. For example, Spence (1973) and Machlup (1970) note that education could just
be a credential, which does not raise individuals' productivities. It is also possible that insome
developing countries, where the incidence of unemployment may rise with education (e.g., Blaug,
Layard and Woodhall, 1969) and where the return to physical capital may exceed the return to
human capital (e.g., Harberger, 1965), increases in educationmay reduce total output.
Most of the micro human capital literature focuses on the private rather than social return
to education, but the fmding of little ability bias in the Mincerianwage equation casts doubt on
at least some forms of credentialling arguments. The possibility of externalities to education
motivates much of the macro growth literature, to which we now turn.
3. Macro growth equations
Thirty years ago, Fritz Machlup (1970, p. 1) observed, "The literature on the subject of
education and economic growth is some two hundred years old, but only in the last tenyears has
the flow of publications taken on the aspects of a flood." The number ofcross-country regression
studies on education and growth has surged even higher in recentyears. The literature is
voluminous, and a new journal has been devoted solely to economic growth. Rather than
exhaustively review the literature, we summarize the main models and findings, and explore the
impact of several econometric issues.
The macro growth literature yields three principally different conclusions from the micro
literature. First, the initial stock of human capital matters, not the change in humancapital.
Second, secondary and post-secondary education matter more for growth than primary education.
Third, female education has an insignificant and sometimes negative effect on economicgrowth.11
3.1 From the Mincer Model to the Macro Growth Model
To compare the Mincer model to the macro growth literature, first considera Mincerian
wage equation for each country jandtime period t:
(1') in=+PljESkjt +
where we have suppressed the experience term for convenience. This equationcan be aggregated
across individuals each year by taking the means of each of the variables, yielding what Heckman
and Klenow (1997) call the "Macro-Mincer" wage equation:
(2) ln=+ +
where y8, denotes the geometric mean wage andis mean education. Heckman and Kienow
(1997) compare the coefficient on education from cross-country log GDP equations to the
coefficient on education from micro Mincer models. Once they control for lifeexpectancy to
proxy for technology differences across countries, they fmd that the macro and micro regressions
yield similar estimates of the effect of education on income.9 They conclude from this exercise
that the "macro versus micro evidence for human capital externalities is not robust."
The macro Mincer equation can be differenced betweenyear t and t- 1, giving:
(3) Am ='0+ PljtSjt - +Ac'
where A signifies the change in the variable from t-1 to t, '0 is the meanchange in the intercepts,
and A€isa composite error that includes the deviation between each country's intercept change
and the overall average. Differencing the equation removes the effect ofany additive, permanent
9When they omit life expectancy, however, education has a much larger effect in themacro regression than micro
regression. Whether longer life expectancy is a valid proxy for technology differences, or a result ofhigher income,
is an open question (see Smith, 1999).12
differences in technology. If the return to schooling is constantover time, we have:
(4) Mn =p'0 +p1as+
Notice that this fonnulation allows the time-invariant return toschooling to vary across countries.
Ifdoes vary across countries, and a constant-coefficient model isestimated, then (f31-1)AS
will add to the error term.
Also notice that if the return to schooling varies over time, thenby adding and subtracting
from the right-hand-side of equation (3), we obtain:
(5) Mn =Po + ÷ +
where ô is the change in the return to schooling (Al)1).Ifthe return to schooling has increased
(decreased) secularly over time, the initial level of education will enter positively(negatively) into
equation (5).Animplicit assumption in much of the macro growth literature therefore is that the
return to education is either unchanged, or changed endogenously, by the stock of humancapital.
Although the empirical literature for the U.S. clearly shows a fall in the return to education
in the 1970s and a sharp increase in the 1980s (e.g., Levy andMurnane, 1992), the findings for
other countries are mixed. For example, Psacharopolous (1994; Table6) fmds that in the average
country the Mincerian return to education fell by 1.7 points over periods of variouslenghths
(average of 12 years) since the late 1960s. By contrast, O'Neill (1995) finds that between 1967
and 1985 the return to education measured in terms of its contributionto GDP rose by 58percent
in developed countries and by 64 percent in less developed countries.
The typical macro growth model estimated in the literature is motivatedby the convergence
literature. This leads to interest in estimatingparameters of an underlying model such as AY1 =
- l)(Y1Y*)+ pj,whereAY denotes the annualized change in log GDP per capita in country13
jbetweent-1 and t, ccdenotescountry j's steady-state growth rate,is the log of initial GDP
per-capita, Y'J is steady-state log GDP per capita, and 3 measures the speed ofconvergence to
steady-state income. The intuition for this equation is straightforward: countries that are below
their steady-state income level should grow quickly, and those thatare above it should grow
slowly. A typical estimating equation is:
(6) AY =f3 + + 132S.l + +
where AY is the change in log GDP per capita fromyear t-1 to t, is average years of
schooling in the population in the initial year, E-jisthe log of initial (}DP per capita, and 4
includesvariables such as inflation, capital, or the 'rule of law index."0 Also note thatschooling
is sometimes specified in logaritimfic units in equation (6). Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1995),
Benhabiband Spiegel (1994), and others conclude that the change in schooling hasan insignificant
effect if it is included in a GDP growth equation, even though this variable ispredicted to matter
in the Mincer model and in some endogenous economicgrowth models (e.g., Lucas, 1988).
Equation (6) is typically estimated with data for a cross-section or pooled sample of countries
spanning a 5, 10, or 20 year period.
The first-differenced macro-Mincer equation (4) differs from themacro growth equation
in several respects. First, the macro growth models use thechange in log GDP per capita as the
dependent variable, rather than the change in the mean of log earnings. If income hasa log
normal distribution with a constant variance over time, and if labor's share is alsoconstant, then
'°Henceforth we use the terms GDP per capita and GDPinterchangeably.14
aggregating GDP in this way would not matter." Without micro data for a large sample of
countries over time, the impact of aggregation is difficult toassess, and we do not pursue this
issue further. Second, and probably more importantly, the macrogrowth literature typically omits
the change in schooling. Third, because the macro models are motivatedby issues of convergence
they include the initial level of GDP, capital, and correlates for steady-state income. Indeed,a
primary motivation for including human capital variables in these equations is to control for steady
state income, Y.
3.1.1 Interpretation
There are at least six ways to interpret the coefficient on the initial level ofschooling in
equation (6).12First,schooling may be a proxy for steady-state income. Countries with more
schooling would be expected to have a higher steady-state income, so conditional on GDP in the
initial year, we would expect more educated countries togrow faster (j32 >0). 13Ifthis were the
case, higher schooling levels would not change the steady-state growth rate, although it would
raise steady-state income. Second, schooling could change thesteady-state growth rate by
enabling the work force to develop, implement and adopt new technologies (see Nelson and
Phelps, 1966 Welch, 1970 and Romer, 1990), again leading to the prediction>0.Third,
countries with low initial stocks of human capital could havegreater opportunities to grow by
ttHeckman andKienow(1997) point out that halfthevariance of log incomewill be added to the GDP equation
if income is log normal.
22SeeAghionandHowitt(1998) and Temple (1999a) for excellent overviews of growth models.
'3Transitory measurement error in GDP will have the same effect.15
implementing technology developed abroad. In this case, one would expect<o Aghionand
Howjtt (1998) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) suggest, however, that for countries with below-
average productivity and income, this "catch-up" effect would be more prominent among those
with higher average educational attainment, yielding the prediction f32>0for this subset of
countries.
Fourth, a positive or negative coefficient on initial schoolingmay simply reflect an
exogenous change in the return to schooling, as shown in equation (5). Fifth, anticipated
increases in future economic growth could cause schooling to rise (i.e., reversecausality), as
argued by Bils and Klenow (1998). Sixth, the schooling variable may "pick up' the effect of the
change in education, which is typically omitted from the growth equation.
3.2 Bask Results and Effect of Measurement Error
Table1 replicates and extends the "growth accounting" and "endogenousgrowth"
regressions in Benhabib and Spiegel's (1994) influential paper.'4 Their analysis is basedon
Kyriacous (1991) measure of average years of schooling for the work force in 1965 and 1985,
Summers and Heston's GDP and labor force data, and a measure ofphysical capital derived from
investment flows for a sample of 78 countries. Following Benhabib andSpiegel, the regression
in column (1) relates the annualized growth rate of GDP to thelog change in years of schooling.
'4We were not able to exactly replicate Benhabib and Spiegel's results becausewe use a revised version of
Summers and Heston's GDP data. Nonetheless, our estimates are very close to theirs. Forexample, Benhabib and
Spiegel report coefficients of -.059 forthe change in log education and .545 for the change in log capital when they
estimate the model in column 1 of Table 1; our estimates are -.072 and .523. Some of the other coefficientsdiffer
because of scaling; for comparability with later results, we divided the dependent variable and variablesmeasured in
changes by 20.16
From this model, Benhabib and Spiegel conclude, "Our fmdings shed some doubton the
traditional role given to human capital in the developmentprocess as a separate factor of
production." Instead, they conclude that the stock of education matters for growth (see colunm
2 and 5)byenabling countries with a high level of education to adopt and innovate technology
faster.
Topel argues that Benhabib and Spiegel's fmding of an insignificant and wrong-signed
effect of schooling changes on GDP growth is due to their log specification of education.'5 The
log-log specification follows if one assumes that schooling enters an aggregate Cobb-Douglas
production function linearly. Given the success of the Mincer model, however, we wouldagree
with Topel that it is more natural to specify human capital as an exponential function ofschooling
in a Cobb-Douglas production function, so the change in linearyears of schooling would enter
the growth equation. In any event, the logarithmic specification ofschooling does not fully
explain the perverse effect of educational improvements on growth in Benhabib and Spiegel's
analysis.'6 Results of estimating a linear education specification in column 4 still showa
statistically insignificant (though positive) effect of the linear change in schooling on economic
growth.
Columns 3 and 6 show that controlling for capital is key to Benhabib and Spiegel'sfinding
of an insignificant effect of the change in schooling variable. When physicalcapital is excluded
'5Mankiw, Romer and Well (1992; Table VI) estimate a similar specification.
"The log specification is part of the explanation, however, because if the model in column(3) is estimated without
the initial level of schooling, the change in log schooling has a negative and statisticallysignificant effect, whereas
the change in the level of schooling has a positive and statistically significant effect if it is includedas a regressor in
this model instead.17
from the growth equation, the change in schooling has a statistically significant andpositive effect
in either the linear or log schooling specification. Why doescontrolling for capital have such a
large effect on education? As shown below, it appears that the insignificant effect of thechange
in education is a result of the low signal in the education change variable. Indeed,we show below
that conditional on the other variables that Benhabib and Spiegel hold constant(especially capital),
the change in schooling conveys virtually no signal.'7
Notice also that the coefficient on capital is high in Table 1, around .50witha t-ratio close
to 10.Ina competitive, Cobb-Douglas economy, the coefficient on capital growth in a GDP
growth regression should equal capital's share of national income. Gollin (1998) estimates that
labor's share ranges from .65to.80 in most countries, after allocating labor's portion of self-
employment and proprietors'income. Consequently, capital's share is probably no higher than
.20 to .35. Two reasons why the coefficient on capital could be biasedupwards are: (1)
measured capital is derived from investment flows, and GDP is a direct function ofinvestment,
so errors in the investment data will be positively correlated with the dependent variable;(2)
countries that experience rapid GDP growthmay find it easier to raise investment, creating
simultaneity bias. These factors might explain why capital has such a large andsignificant
coefficient in the growth equations. If the coefficient on capitalgrowth in column (5)ofTable
1 is constrained to equal .20 or .35-- aplausible range for capital's share --thecoefficient on the
schooling change rises to .09 or .06, and becomes statistically significant.
'7Pritchctt (1998) estimates essentially the same model as Renhabib andSpiegel (i.e., column 1 of Table 1), and
instruments for schooling growth using an alternative education series. However, if there isno variability in the
portion of measured schooling changes that represent true schooling changes conditional on capital, the instrumental
variables strategy is inconsistent. This can easily he seen by noting that there would beno variability due to true
education changes conditional on capital in the reduced form of the model.18
3.2.1 The Extent of Measurement Error in International Education Data
We disregard errors that arise because years of schooling are an imperfectmeasure of
human capital, and focus instead on the more tractable problem of estimating the extent of
measurement error in cross-country data on average years of schooling. Benhabib and Spiegel's
measure of average years of schooling for the work force was derived by Kyriacou (1991) as
follows. First, survey-based estimates of average years of schooling for 42 countries in the mid
I 970s were regressed on the countries primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollmentrates.
Coefficient estimates from this model were then used to predictyears of schooling from
enrollment rates for all countries in 1965 and 1985. This method is likely togenerate substantial
noise since the fitted regression may not hold for all countries and time periods, enrollmentrates
are frequently rnismeasured, and the enrollment rates are not properly aligned with the workforce.
Changes in education derived from this measure are likely to be particularly noisy. Benhabib and
Spiegel use Kyriacou's education data for 1965, as well as the change between 1965 and 1985.
The widely-used Barro and Lee (1993) data set is an alternative source of education data.
For 40 percent of country-year cells, Barro and Lee measureaverage years of schooling by
survey- and census-based estimates reported by UNESCO. The remaining observations were
derived from historical enrollment flow data using a "perpetual inventory method.''8 The Barro-
Lee measure is undoubtedly an advance over existing internationalmeasures of educational
attainment, but errors in measurement are inevitable because the UNESCO enrollment ratesare
of doubtful quality in many countries (see Behrman and Rosensweig, 1993 and1994). For
'8Each countty has a survey- and census-based estimate in at leastone year, which provides an anchor for the
enrollment flows.19
example, UNESCO data are often based on beginning of the year enrollment. Additionally,
students educated abroad are miscounted in the flow data, which is probably a larger problem for
higher education. More fundamentally, secondary and tertiary schooling is defined differently
across countries in the UNESCO data, so years of secondary and higher schooling are likely to
be noisier than overall schooling. Notice also that because errors cumulate over time in Barro and
Lee's stock-flow calculations, the errors in education will be positively correlatedover time.
As is well known, if an explanatory variable is measured with additive white noiseerrors,
then the coefficient on this variable will be attenuated toward zero in a bivariateregression, with
the attenuation factor, R, asymptotically equal to the ratio of the variance of thecorrectly-
measured variable to the variance of the observed variable (see,e.g., Griliches, 1986). A similar
result holds in a multiple regression (with correctly-measured covariates), onlynow the variances
are conditional on the other variables in the model. To estimate attenuation bias due to
measurement error, write a nation's measured years of schooling, S, as it's true schooling,
SfK,
plus a measurement error denoted e: S =S+ ej. It is convenient to start with the assumption
that the measurement errors are "classical"; that is, errors that are uncorrelated with5*, other
variables in the growth equation, and the equation error term. Now let S' and 52denotetwo
imperfect measures of average years of schooling for each country, with measurementerrors &
ande2 respectively (where we suppress the jsubscript).
If e' and e2 are uncorrelated, the fraction of the observed variability in 51 dueto
measurement error can be estimated as R1 =cov(S',S2)/var(S').R1 is often referred to as the
reliability ratio of 1,andhas probability limit equal to var(S*)/lvar(S*)+var(e5}. Assuming
constant variances, the reliability of the data expressed in changes (R) will be lower than the20
cross-sectional reliability if the serial correlation of the true variable is higher than the serial
correlation of the measurement errors because R51 =var(S*)/{var(S*)+ var(e)(1-rj/(1-p,)},
where r is the serial correlation of the errors and p is the serial correlation of trueschooling.
In practice, the reliability ratio for changes in S1 can be estimatedby: RAS1 =
cov(AS'4S2)/var(aS').Note that if the errors in 5' and S 2are positively correlated, the estimated
reliability ratios will be biased upward.
We can calculate the reliability of the Barro-Lee and Kyriacou data if we treat thetwo
variables as independent estimates of educational attainment. It is probably thecase, however,
that the measurement errors in the two data sources are positively correlatedbecause, to some
extent, they both rely on the same mismeasured enrollment data)9 Consequently, the reliability
ratios derived from comparing these two measures probably provide anupper bound on the
reliability of the data series.
Panel A of Table 2 presents estimates of the reliability ratio of the Kyriacou and Barro-Lee
education data. Appendix Table A. 1 reports the correlation and covariance matrices forthe
measures. The reliability ratios were derived by regressing one measure ofyears of schooling on
the other.2° The cross-sectional data have considerable signal, with thereliability ratio ranging
'9Another complication is that the Kyriacou data pertain to the education of the work force, whereasthe Bano-Lee
data pertain to the entire population age 25andolder. If the regression slope relating true education of workers to
the true education of the population is one, the reliability ratios reported in the text are unbiased.Although we do
not know true education of workers and the population, in the Barro-Lee data set a regression of theaverage years
of schooling of men (who are very likely to work) on the average education of the populationyields a slope of .99,
suggestingthat workers and the population may have close to a unit slope.
20Barro and Lee (1993) compare their education measure with alternative seriesby reporting correlation
coefficients.For example, they report a correlation of .89 with Kyriacou's education data and .93 with
Psacharopolous' s. Our cross-sectional correlations are not very different. They do not report correlations forchanges in education.21
from .77 to .85 in the Barro-Lee data and exceeding .96 in the Kyriacou data. Thereliability
ratios fall by 10 to 30 percent if we condition on the log of 1965 GDPper capita, which is a
common covariate. More disconcerting, when the data are measured in changes over the 20year
period, the reliability ntio for the data used by Benhabib and Spiegel falls to less than 20percent.
By way of comparison, note that Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) find that the reliability of self-
reported years of education is .90 in micro data on workers, and that the reliability of self-
reported differences in education between identical twins is .57.
These results suggest that if there were no otherregressors in the model, the estimated
effect of schooling changes in Benhabib and Spiegel's results would be biased downwardby 80
percent. But the bias is likely to be even greater because their regressions include additional
explanatory variables that absorb some of the true changes in schooling. The reliability ratio
conditional on the other variables in the model can be shown toequal R'51 =(R51-R2)I(1-R2),
where R2 is the multiple coefficient of determination from a regression of the measuredschooling
change variable on the other explanatory variables in the model. A regression of the change in
Kyriacou's education measure on the covariates in colunm (4) of Table 1 yields an R2 of 23
percent. If the covariates are correlated with the signal in education changes and not the noise,
then there is novariabilityin true schooling changes left over in the measured schooling changes
conditional on the other variables in the model. Instead of rejecting the traditional Mincerian role
of education on growth, a reasonable interpretation is that Benhabib andSpiegel's results shed no
light on the role of education changes on growth.
The Barro and Lee data convey more signal than Kyriacou's data whenexpressed in
changes. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of the variability in observed changes inyears of education22
in the Barro-Lee data represent true changes. This makes the Barro-Lee datapreferable to use
to estimate the effect of educational improvements. Despite thegreater reliability of the Barro-
Lee data, there is still little signal left over in these data conditionalon the other variables in the
model in column 4 of Table 1; a regression of the change in the Barro-Leeschooling measure on
the change in capital, change in population, and initial schoolingyields an R2 of .28.
Consequently, conditional on these variables about 40 percent of the remainingvariability in
schooling changes in the Barro-Lee data is true signal.
As mentioned, we suspect the estimated reliability ratios are biasedupward because the
errors in the Kyriacou and Barro-Lee data are probably positively correlated. To derivea
measure of education with independent errors, we calculated averageyears of schooling from the
World Values Survey (WVS) for 34 countries. The WVScontainsmicro data from household
surveys that were conducted in nearly 40 countries in 1990 or 1991. The survey was designed
to be comparable across countries. In each country, individualswere asked to report the age at
which they left school. With an assumption of school startage, we can calculate the average
number of years that individuals spent in school. We also calculatedaverage years of secondary
and higher schooling by counting years of schooling obtained after 8years of schooling as
secondary and higher schooling. Notice that these measures will not be error free either. Errors
could arise, for example, because some individuals repeatedgndes, because we have made an
erroneous assumption about school start age or the beginning of secondary schooling,or because
of sampling errors. But the errors in this measure should beindependent of the errors in
Kyriacou' s and Barro and Lee's data. The appendix provides additional details ofour calculations
with the WVS.23
Panel B of Table 2 reports the reliability ratios for the Barro-Lee data and WVS data for
1990. The reliability ratio of .90 for the Barro-Lee data in 1990 is slightly higher than the
estimate for 1985 based Kyriacou' s data, but within one standard error. Thus, itappears that
correlation between the errors in Kyriacou's and Barro-Lee's data is not a seriousproblem.
Nonetheless, another advantage of the WVS data is that they can be used to calculateupper
secondary schooling using a constant (if imperfect) defmition across countries. As one might
expect given differences in the defmition of secondary schooling in the UNESCO data, the
reliability of the secondary and higher schooling (.72) is lower than the reliability of allyears of
schooling.
Lastly, it should be noted that the measurement errors in schooling are highly serially
correlated in the Barro-Lee data. This can be seen from the fact that the correlation between the
1965 and 1985 schooling levels across countries is .97 in the Barro-Lee data, while less than90
percent of the variations in the cross-sectional data across countries appear to represent true
signal. If the reliability ratios reported in Table 2 are correct, the onlyway the time-series
correlation in education could be so high is if the errors are serially correlated. The correlation
of the errors can be estimated as:
[cov(Sg5,SL6)_cov(5B ,S )]/[(1_RBt)var(s35)(1_R65)var(58L65)] 1/2,
where the superscript BL stands for Barro-Lee's data and K for Kyriacou's data.Using the
reliability ratios in Table 2, the estimated correlation of the errors in Barro-Lee's schooling
measure between 1965 and 1985 is .61. The correlation between true schooling in 1965 and 198524
is estimated at 9721Sincethe serial correlation of true schooling is higher than the serial
correlation of the errors, the reliability of the first-differenced education data is lower thanthe
reliability of the cross-sectional data.
3.3 Additional Growth Models
Measurement errors aside, one could question whether physical capital should be included
in a GDP growth equation because it is potentially an endogenous variable. Fastgrowing
countries have more access to capital (Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan,1993). Additionally,
considerations of the low signal in schooling changes conditionalon capital growth, and the
mechanical correlation between measured capital and GDP (sincecapital is typically derived from
investment), lead us to prefer parsimonious models that omit capital. Barro (1997) also excludes
capital, so there is precedent for a parsimonious specification in the growth literature. We first
report models without controlling for capital, and then focus on the effect of capital inlong-
difference models in Section 3.6.
Table 3 reports "stylized" macro growth models withoutcontrolling for physical capital
for samples spanning 5, 10 or 20 year periods. The dependent variable is theannualized change
in the log of real GDP per capita per year based on Sununers and Heston's(1991) Penn World
Tables, Mark 5:6. Results are generally similar if GDPper worker is used instead. We use GDP
per capita because it reflects labor force participation decisions and because it has been the focus
of much of the previous literature. The schooling variable is Barro and Lee'smeasure of average
21We estimate the serial correlation between true schooling levels in 1985and1965using the formula: P5. =
[cov(SB5,S)cov(SB,S1<)fcov(s8L,,sK)cov(sBLsK)] 1/225
years of schooling for the population age 25 and older. When the change in average schooling
is included as a regressor in these models, we divide it by the number ofyears in the time span
so the coefficients are comparable across columns. The equations were estimated by OLS, but
the standard errors reported in the table allow for a country-specificcomponent in the error
term.22 We exclude other variables (e.g., rule of law index) that are sometimes included inmacro
growth models to focus on education, and because those other variables are probably influenced
themselves by educationY
Our fmdings confirm the results in Topel (1999). The change in schooling has little effect
on GDP growth when the growth equation is estimated with high frequency changes (i.e., S
years). However, increases in average years of schooling have a positive and statistically
significant effect on economic growth over periods of 10 or 20 years. The magnitude of the
coefficient estimates on both the change and initial level of schooling over long periodsare large,
probably too large to represent the causal effect of schooling.
The fmding that the time span matters so much for the change in educationsuggests that
measurement error in schooling influences these estimates. Over short time periods, there is little
change in a nation's true mean schooling level, so the transitory component of measurement error
in schooling would be large relative to variability in the true change. Overlonger periods, true
education levels are more likely to change, increasing the signal relative to the noise in measured
An alternative approach would be to estimate a restricted seemingly unrelatedsystemor random effects model.
Absent measurement error, these estimators are more efficient. But because bias due to measurementerrors in the
explanatory variables is exacerbated with these estimators, we elected to estimate the parameters by OLS andreport robust standard errors.
231f we control for the initial fertility rate, the education variable becomes much weakerand insignificant. See
Krueger and Lindahl (1999).26
changes. Measurement error bias appears to be greater over the 5 and 10 year horizons, but it
is still substantial over 20 years. Since the change in schooling and initial level of GDPare
essentially uncorrelated, the coefficient on the 20-year change in schooling in column 8 is biased
downward by a factor of l-RAS, which is around 40 percent according to Table 2.Thus, adjusting
for measurement error would lead the coefficient on the change in education to increase from .18
to .30 =.18/(1-.4).This is an enormous return to investment in schooling, equal to three or four
times the private return to schooling estimated within most countries. Thelarge coefficient on
schooling suggests the existence of quite large externalities from educational changes (Lucas,
1988) or simultaneous causality in which growth causes greater educational attainment. It is
plausible that simultaneity bias is greater over longer time intervals, so some combination of
varying measurement error bias and simultaneity bias could account for the time pattern of results
displayed in Table 3.
Like Benhabib and Spiegel, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) conclude thatcontemporaneous
changes in schooling do not contribute to economic growth. There are four reasons to doubt their
conclusion, however. First, Barro and Sala-i-Martin analyze a mixed sample that combines
changes over both 5-year (1985-90) and 10-year (1965-75 and 1975-85) periods;examining
changes over such short periods tends to exacerbate the downward bias due to measurement
errors. Second, they examine changes in average years of secondary and higherschooling. As
was shown in Table 2, the cross-sectional reliability of secondary and higher schooling is lower
than the reliability of all years of schooling, and the changes are likely to be less reliableas well.
Third, they include separate variables for changes in male and femaleyears of secondary and
higher schooling. These two variables are highly correlated (r= .85), which wouldexacerbate27
measurement error problems if the signal in the variables is more highly correlated than the noise.
If average years of secondary and higher schooling for men andwomen combined, or years of
secondary and higher schooling for either men or women, is used instead of allyears of schooling
in the 10-year change model in column 6 of Table 3, the change in education hasa sizable,
statistically significant effect. Fourth, they estimate a restricted Seemingly UnrelatedRegression
(SUR) system, which exacerbates measurement error bias becauseasymptotically this estimator
is equivalent to a weighted average of an OLS and fixed-effects estimator.
Barro (1997) stresses the importance of male, secondary andhigher education as a
determinant of GDP growth. In his analysis, female secondary andhigher education is negatively
related to growth. We have explored the sensitivity of the estimates tousing different measures
of education: namely, primary versus higher education, and maleversus female education. When
we test for different effects of years of primary and secondary and higherschooling in the model
in colunm 6 of Table 3, we cannot reject that allyears of schooling have the same effect on GDP
growth (p-value equals .40 for initial levels and .12 for changes). We also findinsignificant
differences between primary and secondary schooling if we justuse male schooling. We do find
significant differences if we further disaggregate schooling levels by gender, however. Theinitial
level of primary schooling has a positive effect forwomen and a negative effect for men, the
initial level of secondary school has a negative effect forwomen and a positive effect for men, the
change in primary schooling has a positive effect for women and a negative effect formen, and
the change in secondary schooling has a negative effect forwomen and a positive effect for men.
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) also examine the differential effect of male andfemale
education on growth over five year intervals. They estimatea fixed effects variant of equation28
(6), and instrument for initial education and GDP with their lags. Contrary to Barro, they find
that female education has a positive and statistically significant effect on growth, while male
education has a negative and statistically significant effect. This resultappears to stem from the
introduction of fixed effects: if we estimate the model with fixed effects bitt withoutinstrumenting
for education, we find the same gender pattern, whereas if we estimate the model without fixed
effects and instrument with lags the results are similar to Barro 's. Althoughcountry fixed effects
arguably belong in the growth equation, it is particularly difficult to untangle any differential
effects of male and female education in such a specification because measurementerror is
exacerbated.24 But Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort's findings are consistent withthe micro-
econometric literature, which fmds education has a higher return for women thanmen.
We conclude that because schooling levels are highly correlated for men andwomen, one
needs to be cautious interpreting the effect of education in models that disaggregate educationby
gender and level of schooling. For this reason, and because the total number ofyears of education
is the variable specified in the Mincer model, we have a preference forusing the average of all
years of schooling for men and women combined in our econometric analysis.
3.4 Initial Level of Education
The effect of the initial level of education on growth has beenwidely interpreted as an
indication of large externalities from the stock of a nation's humancapital on growth. Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994; p. 160), for example, conclude, "The resultssuggest that the role of human
24Note that instrumenting with lagged education does not solve themeasurement error problem because we fmd
that measurement errors in education are highly correlated over time.29
capital is indeed one of facilitating adoption of technology from abroad and creation of appropriate
domestic technologies rather than entering on its own as a factor of production." And Barro
(1997, p. 19) observes, "On impact, an extra year of male upper-level schooling is therefore
estimated to raise the growth rate by a substantial 1.2 percentage pointsper year." Topel (1999),
however, argues that "the magnitude of the effect of education on growth is vastly toolarge to be
interpreted as a causal force." Indeed, Topel calculates that the present value of a onepercentage
point faster growth rate from an additional year of schooling would be about four times thecost,
with a 5percentreal discount rate. He concludes that externalities from schoolingmay exist, but
they are unlikely to be so large. One possibility --whichwe explore and end up rejecting --is
that level of schooling is spuriously reflecting the effect of the change inschooling on growth.
Countries with higher initial levels of schooling tended to havelarger increases in
schooling over the next 10 or 20 years in Barro and Lee's data, which is remarkable given that
measurement error in schooling will induce a negative covariance between the change and initial
level of schooling. We initially suspected that the base level ofschooling spuriously picks up the
effect of schooling increases, either because schooling changesare excluded from the growth
equation or because the included variable is noisy. The following calculations make clear that this
is unlikely, however.
To proceed, it is convenient to write the cross-country growthequation as:
(7) A Y =+1S1 + 32S +
whereasterisks signify the correctly measured initial and ending schooling variables, andwe have30
suppressed the country jsubscript.25We have also ignored covariates, but they could easily be
'pre-regressed out" in what follows. If all that matters for growth is the change in schooling, we
would fmd ft=-132. A test of whether the initial level of schooling has an independent, positive
effect on growth conditional on the change in schooling turns on whether 131+132>0.
In practice, equation (7) is estimated with noisy measures of schooling that haveserially
correlated errors, as previously documented. Under the assumption of serially correlated but
otherwise classical measurement errors, it can be shown that the limit of the coefficienton initial
schooling is:
o n"s cov(S ,S)
(8)plim b1 =
2




where R1 and R51 are the reliability ratios for S1 and S, r is the correlation betweenand S,
and A =cov(S*1 1,S*j/cov(S t45)isless than one if the measurement errors are positively
correlated. An analogous equation holds for b2. Some algebra establishes that the sum b1+b2 has
probability limit:
R (1 iTñ+ArOIJ—r) R5(1—1Jf'r)+Xr(*'—r)
(9)plim(b1 +b2)=131 ' P2 1,2 1—r2
where 4i = var(Sjfvar(S1).
Notice that if the variance in the measurement errors and the variance in trueschooling
are constant, then:
Notice that the scaling differs here from that in Table 1 and 3:namely, we do not divide any explanatory variable
by the number of years in the period in Table 4.31
R+Ar (10)plun(b1 +b2)=(j3+ ______
1 +,'
whereR5 is the time-invariant reliability ratio of the schooling data.26 Since (R5 + Xr)I(1+r)
is bounded by zero and one, in this case the sum of the coefficients isnecessarily attenuated
toward zero, so we would underestimate the effect of the initial level of education.Hence,
measurement error in schooling is unlikely to drive the significance of the initial effect of
education.
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (7) over 5, 10 and 20year periods. The bottom of
the table reports b1 + b2, as well as the measurement-error-corrected estimate ofb1 + b2.
We estimated the numerator of A using the covariance between the 1990 WVS data andlagged
Barro-Lee data (either 5, 10 or 20 year lags), and we estimated R5 from the WVS dataas well.27
Over each time interval, the results indicate that the negative coefficienton initial education is not
as large in magnitude as the positive coefficient on second-period education, consistent withour
earlier finding that the initial level has a positive effect on growth conditionalon the change in
education. Moreover, the correction for measurement error tends to raiseb1 +b2 by .0004 to
.0021 log points.
Finally, as an alternative approach to the measurement error problem, in columns 7 and
26Griliches (1986) derives the corresponding formula if measurementerrors are serially uncorrelated.
27th models that include initial GOP, we first remove the effect of initial GOP beforecalculating R511, R5 and A.
In the models without initial GOP, we assume R5,1 =R.32
8 we use Kyriacou' s schooling measures as instruments for Barro and Lee's schooling data 28If
the measurement errors in the two data sets are uncorrelated, one set of measures can be usedas
an instrument for the other. Although the IV model can only be estimated for a subset of
countries, these results also suggest that measurement error in schooling is not responsible for the
positive effect of the initial level of schooling on economic growth.29 Moreover, if Barro and
Lee's data are used to instrument for Kyriacous data in this equation, the sum of theschooling
coefficients in column (8) nearly doubles.
3.5 Measurement Error in GDP
Another possibility is that transitory measurement errors in GDP explainwhy initial
schooling matters in the growth equation. Intuitively, this would work as follows: If acountry
has a low level of education for its measured GDP, it is likely that its true GDP is less than its
measured GDP. If the error in GDP is transitory, then subsequent GDP growth willappear
particularly strong for such a country because the negative error in the GDP is unlikely torepeat
in the second period. One indication that this may contribute to thestrong effect of the level of
education comes from including second period GDP instead of initial GDP in thegrowth equation.
In this situation, measurement errors in GDP would be expected to have theopposite effect on the
initial level of education. Md indeed, if second period GDP is included instead of initial GDP
28Sometimes the growth literature uses lagged variables as instruments. Since themeasurement errors are highly
serially correlated in education (and other variables), this is unlikely to completely solve measurement error problems.
291f the model in column (8) is estimated by OLS with the subsample of 67countries, the results are virtually
identical to those for the full sample in column (6).33
in the model in column (7) of Table 3, the coefficient on initial education becomesnegative and
statistically insignificant.
For two reasons, however, we conclude that measurement error in GDP is unlikely to
drive the significant effect of the initial schooling variable. First, in Table 3 and Table 4 it is
clear that the initial level of education has a significant effect even when initial GDP is not held
constant. Second, using the WVS, we calculated the reliability of the Summers and Heston GDP
data for 1990. Specifically, to estimate the reliability of log GDP, R, we regressed thelog of
real income per person in the WVS on the log of real GDP per capita in the Summers and Heston
data. The resulting coefficient was .92 (t-ratio= 12.3), indicating substantial signal. Both
measures were deflated by the same PPP measure in these calculations, which may inflate the
reliability estimate, but if we add log PPP as an additional explanatory variable to the regression
the reliability of the GDP data is .89 (t-ratio= 11.9). Although the WVS income dataneglect non-
household income and these estimates are based on just 17 countries, the results indicate that
Summers and Heston s data convey a fair amount of signal, and that the errors in GDPare highly
serially correlated. If we assume that R is .92 and the serial correlation in the errors is .5,the
coefficient on initial education in the 10-year GDP growth equation would be biasedupward by
about a third.3°
30With constant variances, the limit of the coefficient on initial log GDP isR( -(1-R)(1-r),where R, is the
reliability of log GDP, 3 is the population regression coefficient with correctly-measured GD!', and r is the serial
correlation in the measurement errors. To estimate the effect of measurement error in GD!'on the schooling
coefficient, we constrained the coefficient on initial GDP to equal {b +(l-R)(l-r)}/R,where b is the coefficient
on initial GD!' obtained by OLS without correcting for measurement error, and re-estimated the growthequation.34
3.6 The Effect of Physical Capital
The level and growth rate of capital are natural control variables to include in the GDP
growth regressions. First, initial log GDP can be substituted for capital in a Solow growth model
only if capital s share is constant over time and across countries (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas production
function). Second, and more importantly for our purposes, capital-skill complementarity would
imply that some of the increased output attributed to higher education in Table 3 should be
attributed to increased capital (see, e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1997 on capital-skillcomplementarity).
As mentioned earlier, however, systematic correlation between measurementerrors in capital and
GDP, as well as endogeneity of capital, are reasons to be wary about including thegrowth of
capital in a GDP equation. Here we examine the robustness of our results to controlling for
physical capital.
Column (1) of Tables reports an estimate of the same 20-year growth modelas in column
9 of Table 3, augmented to include the growth of capitalper worker. We use Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare's (1997) capital data because they appear to have more signal than Benhabib and
Spiegel's capital data •31Thecoefficient on the change in education falls by more than 50percent
when capital growth is included, although it remains barely statisticallysignificant at the .10 level.
In colunm (2) we add the initial log capital per worker, and in column(3) exclude the initial log
capital from the column (2) specification. Including initial log capital drives the coefficienton the
change in schooling to close to zero. Notice also that the log of initial capitalper worker has little
31A regression of Benhabib and Spiegel's change in log capitalon the corresponding variable from Klenow and
Rodriguez-dare yields a regression coefficient (and standard error) of .95(.065).The reverse regression yields a
coefficient of .69 (.05). Hence, Kienow and Rodriguez-dare's measureappears to have a high signal-to-noise ratio.35
effect in columns (2) and (3).32Thegrowth of capital per worker has an enormous effect on GDP
growth. With Cobb-Douglas technology and competitive factor markets, the coefficient on the
growth in capital in Table 5 would equal capital's share; instead, the coefficient is at least double
capital's share in most countries (see (3ollth, 1998). This finding is consistent with the errors in
capital being systematically related to GDP, since both are functions of investment. To explore
the sensitivity of the results, in column (4) we constrain the coefficient on the growth incapital
to equal 0.35, which is on the high end of the distribution of non-labor's share around the world.
These results indicate that both the change and initial level of schooling are associated with
economic growth.Moreover, the coefficient on the change in education is similar to
microeconometric estimates.
As mentioned earlier, including capital could exacerbate the measurementerror in
schooling. Indeed, we fmd that the reliability of Barro-Lee's 20-year change in schooling data
falls from .58 to .46 once we condition on the change in capital, suggesting that the coefficient
on the change in schooling in columns 1-3 of Table 5 should be roughly doubled.33 In column
(5), to try to overcome measurement error we estimate the growth equation by instrumental
variables, using Kyriacous schooling data as excluded instruments for the change and level of
schooling. This is the same estimation strategy previously used by Pritchett (1998), but we
321f the change in log capital per work is dropped from the model in column (3), then initiallog capital per worker
does have a statistically significant, negative effect, and the schooling coefficients are similar to those in column9
of Table 3.
33Temple (1999b) fmds that eliminating observations with large residuals causes the coefficient on thegrowth in
education in Benhabib and Spiegel's data to rise and become statistically significant, conditionalon the growth in
capital. We find a similar result with Benhabib and Spiegel's data, although similarly eliminating outliers has little
effect on the results in Table 5 which use the Barro and Lee education data.36
employ different schooling data as instruments, and use a different measure of capital.
Unfortunately, because there is so little signal in education conditional on capital, the IV results
yield a huge standard error (.167). Pritchett similarly fmds a large standard errors from his IV
estimates, although his point estimates are negativeYt One final point on these estimates is that,
to be companble to the Mincerian return to schooling, the coefficient on the change in education
should be divided by labor's share if the aggregate production function isCobb-Douglas and
human capital is an exponential function of schooling. This would raise thecross-country estimate
of the return to schooling even further.
We draw four main lessons from this investigation of the role of capital. First, thechange
in capital has an enormous effect in a GDP growth equation, probably because ofa mechanical
relationship between the errors in measuring capital and GDP or reverse causality. Second, the
impact of both the level and change in schooling on economic growth is sensitive to whether the
change in capital is included in the growth equation nc1allowedto have a coefficient that greatly
exceeds capital's share. Third, controlling for capital exacerbates measurementerror problems
in schooling. Instrumental variables estimates designed to correct formeasurement error in
schooling yield such a large standard error on the change in schooling that the resultsare
consistent with schooling changes having no effect on growth or a large effecton growth. Fourth,
when the coefficient on capital growth is constrained to equal a plausible value,changes in years
of schooling are positively related to economic growth. Overall, unlessmeasurement error
problems in schooling and capital are overcome, we doubt the cross-country growth equations that
34Aside from the different data sources, the difference between our IV results and Pritchett'sappears to result from
his use of log schooling changes. If we use log schooling changes, we also findnegative point estimates.37
control for capital growth will be very informative insofar as the benefit of education is
concerned.
4. Less Restrictive Macro Growth Model
The macro growth equations impose the restriction that all countries have thesame
relationship between growth and initial education, and that the relationship is linear. The first
assumption is particularly worrisome because the micro evidence indicates that the return to
schooling varies considerably across countries, and even across regions within countries. For
example, institutional factors that compress the wage structure in some countries result in lower
returns to schooling in those countries (see, e.g., the essays in Freeman and Katz,1995).
Moreover, one might expect externalities from education to be greater in countries where the
private return is depressed below the world market level. Thus, we first allow the effect of the
stock of education on growth to vary by country. Next, we examine the effect of thelinearity
assumption. Both of these extensions to the standard growth specificationsuggest that the
constrained specification estimated in the literature should be viewed withcaution; qualitatively
different results are obtained when the constraints are relaxed.
4.1 Heterogeneous Country Effects of Education
Consider the following variable-coefficient version of the macrogrowth equation:
(11) AY =P0 +P1Sj.1+
where we allow each country to have a separate schooling coefficient(P1)andignore other
covariates. If there is more than one observationper country, equation (11) can be estimated by38
interacting education with a set of dummy variables indicating each country. It is instructive to
note that the coefficient on education (b1) estimated from the restricted OLSmodelwith a
homogenous education slope can be written as a weighted avenge of the country-specific slopes:
(12) = z= •,, (S-S)2_—
E1,,_1 —S)2
wherethe weights are the country-specific contributions to the variance in schooling. Ofcourse,
if the assumptions of the constant-coefficient model hold (and the other Gauss-Markov
assumptions hold), the wj weights are the most efficient weights. But if a variable-coefficient
model is more appropriate, there is no a priori reason to prefer the OLS weights over other
weights. Indeed, it is rather odd to weight the country-specific slopes by the OLS weights if the
slopes differ across countries. Probably a more relevant single estimate would be the unweighted-
average coefficient, which represents the expected value of the education coefficient for countries
in the world. Lastly, notice that if equation (11) is augmented to include covariates thesimple
weighted avenge interpretation of the constant-coefficient model in (12) does not apply, but the
average of the country-specific coefficients is still informative.35
Table 6 summarizes estimates of a variable-coefficient model using 5-year and10-year
changes in GDP. Panel A reports results of regressing GDP growth onaverage years of schooling
for the population age 25 and older, initial GDP and time dummies. Columns 1 and 3report the
351f country fixed effects are included as covariates in equation (11), however, the OLSconstantcoefficient can
still be decomposed as a weighted average of the country-specific coefficients even if thereare other covariates. But
we exclude country fixed effects so that these estimates are comparable to the earlierones, and because including fixed
effects would exacerbate measurement error bias.39
constant-coefficient model, whereas columns 2 and 4 report the mean of the country-specific
education coefficients. The constant education slope assumption is overwhelmingly rejected by
the data for each time period (p-value C0.0001).Indeed, the R2 of the equations more than
doubles when the education slopes are unconstrained. Of moreconsequence, the average slope
coefficient is negative, though not statistically significant, in the variable-coefficient model. These
results cast doubt on the interpretation of initial education in the constrained macrogrowth
equation common in the literature.
Panel B of Table 6 reports results in which averageyears of secondary and higher
schooling for males is used instead of average years of all education for the entire adult
population. This variable has been emphasized as a key determinant of economic growth in
Barro' s work. Again, however, the results of the constant-coefficient modelare qualitatively
different than those of the variable-coefficient model. Indeed, for theaverage country in the
sample, a greater initial level of secondary and higher education has a statistically significant,
negative association with economic growth over the ensuing 10 years.
The estimates reported in Table 6 exclude the change in education to focuson the effect
of the initial stock of education. We have, however, experimented witha variable-coefficient
model for the 10-year change in education variable. These estimateswere quite fragile. For
example, if we regress annual GDP growth over ten years on a set of interactions between the 10-
year change in education and country dummies, the initial log of GDP per capita, and time
dummies, the average coefficient for the change in education interactions is negative. But ifwe
also include a set of interactions between initial education andcountry dummies in this model, the
average coefficient on the change in education swells to .18, and the avenge coefficient on initial40
education is negative. Since the latter model uses three observations to estimate twoparameters
for each country, we are reluctant to stress these results.
It is clear from Table 6 that education has a heterogenous effect on economicgrowth
across countries. What bearing does this result have on the convergence• literature? Lee, Pesaran
and Smith (1998) show that country heterogeneity in technologicalprogress that is assumed
homogeneous across countries in a fixed-effects model with a lagged dependent variable will
generate a spurious correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. A
similar result will follow if heterogeneous education coefficients are constrained toequal a
constant coefficient, so we would regard the convergence coefficient with some caution since it
depends on controlling for S. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing that we still obtain a
negative average coefficient on education if we drop initial GDP from the variable-coefficient
model. Because we are interested in understanding the role of education in economicgrowth, we
do not pursue the convergence issue further, but we think the results of the variable-coefficient
model reinforce Lee, Pesaran, and Smith's skeptical interpretation of the conventional estimate
of the convergence parameter.
4.2 The Importance of Linearity
It is common in the empirical growth literature to assume that initial education hasa linear
effect on subsequent GDP growth. Although Mincer (1974) provides conditions underwhich
education has a linear relationship with log earnings, these conditions do notnecessarily imply
that the level of initial education has a linear relationship with incomegrowth. The impact of the
linearity assumption has not been rigorously tested in growth models. As a first approach to test41
this assumption, we created a set of dummy variables which indicated whether eachcountry's
initial average years of education fell in the 0-1 range, 1-2 range, 2-3range, and so on. We then
included these dummies in lieu of linear education in the growth regression in colunm (4) of Table
3. Figure 2 displays the dummy coefficients (i.e., the unrestricted relationship) and the estimated
linear relationship between GDP growth and education. The education-CiDP growthrelationship
appears upward sloping at low levels of education, then plateaus between 4 and 8 years of
education, and becomes downward sloping above 8 years of education.
The increment to GDP growth at each level ofaverage education is shown on the bottom
of Figure 2 (i.e., change in the unrestricted relationship). Loosely speaking, the OLSregression
coefficient estimate for education in the linear specification can be thought ofas a weighted
average of the slope increments at each level of education.36 The OLS estimate places more
weight on the slope increment at a particular schooling level if: (1) there is agreater gap in
average years of schooling between countries above and below that schooling level; (2) the
schooling level is close to the median schooling level. Figure 3A displays the weights applied to
the increments by OLS for the linear specification in a model without other covariates.For
comparison, Figures 3B and 3C show histograms of years of schooling for all countries and for
OECD countries.
As in the previous subsection, the OLS weighting scheme is optimal if there isa constant
slope at each schooling level. But if the relationship is not linear over therange of schooling, the
OLS weights may distort the relationship, and other weighting schemesmay be more appropriate.
36This discussion is only approximate for two reasons. First,average years of education is not a categorical
variable; we have transformed it to one. Second, if there are covariates, the relationship ismore complicated. For
more details, see Yitzhaki (1996) and Angrist and Krueger (1999).42
For example, it seems natural to weight the increments by the distribution ofschooling for
countries in the world. Alternatively, we could weight by the OECD 's distribution of education.
The weighted slope is greater than the OLS slope if the distribution of educationthroughout the
world is used to weight the increments in Figure 2, whereas theaverage slope becomes negative
if the OECD distribution of education is used as weights.
An alternative, simpler approach to explore the impact of linearity is to estimatea
nonlinear function of education. Specifically, we included initial education and itssquare in the
model in colunm 4 of Table 3. The data seem to prefer a quadratic specification,as the square
term is statistically significant.37 More importantly, the relationship is inverted-Ushaped, with
a peak at 7.5yearsof education. Since the mean education level for OECD countries in 1990was
8.4 years in Barro and Lee's data, the average OECDcountry is on the downward-sloping
segment of the education-growth profile. We similarly fmd an inverted-U shaped relationship
between education and GDP growth which peaks below the level of education ofdeveloped
countries when we examine 5and20 year changes in GDP, or male upper secondary schooling.38
These fmdings underscore W. Arthur Lewis's (1964) observation that, "it isnot possible to draw
a simple straight line relating secondary education to economic growth.
37See Krueger and Lindahl (1999).
38Although these findings may appear surprising in light of the macro growth literature,they are consistent with
results in Barro (1997; Table 1.1, column 1). In particular, the interaction between maleupper-secondaiy education
and log GDP has a negative effect on growth, and the results imply the effect ofschooling on growth becomes
negative for countries whose GDP exceeds the average by 1.9 log units.43
5. Conclusion
The micro and macro literatures both emphasize the role of education in incomegrowth.
An accumulation of research using individual-level education and income data since thebeginning
of the 20th century provides robust evidence of a substantial payoff to investment ineducation,
especially for those who traditionally complete low levels of schooling. From the micro evidence,
it is unclear whether the social return to schooling exceeds the privatereturn, although available
evidence suggests that positive externalities in the form of reduced crime and reduced welfare
participation are more likely to be reaped from investments in disadvantaged than advantaged
groups (e.g., Heckman and Klenow, 1997). The macroeconomic evidence of externalities in
terms of technological progress from investments in higher education seems to us morefragile,
resulting from imposing constant-coefficient and linearity restrictions that are rejected by the data.
Our findings also help resolve an important inconsistency between the micro andmacro
literatures on education: Contrary to Benhabib and Spiegel's (1994) and Barro andSala-i-Martin's
(1995) conclusions, the cross-country regressions indicate that the change in education is
positively associated with economic growth once measurement error in education is accounted for.
Indeed, after adjusting for measurement error, the change inaverage years of schooling often has
a greater effect in the cross-country regressions than in the within-country microregressions. The
larger return to schooling found in the cross-country models suggests that reversecausality or
omitted variables create problems at the country level of analysis,or that increases in average
educational attainment generate nationwide externalities. Although the microeconometricevidence
in several countries suggests that within countries the causal effect ofeducation on earnings can
be estimated reasonably well by taking educationas exogenous, it does not follow that cross-44
country differences in education can be taken as a cause of income as opposed to a result of
current income or anticipated income growth. Moreover, countries that improve their educational
systems are likely to concurrentiy change other policies that enhance growth, possibly producing
a different source of omitted-variable bias in cross-country analyses.
Education, as Harbison and Myers (1965) stress, "is both the seed and the flower of
economic development." It is difficult to separate the causal effect of education from the positive
income demand for education in cross-country data. Mankiw (1997) describes thepresumed
exogeneity of school enrollment as the 'weak link" in the empirical growth literature. In our
opinion, this link is unlikely to be strengthened unless researchers can identify natural experiments
in schooling attainment similar to those that have been exploited in the microeconometric
literature, and unless measurement errors in the cross-country data are explicitly taken into
account in the econometric modelling. In view of the difficulties in obtaining accuratecountry-
level data on changes in educational attainment, it might be preferrable to examinegrowth across
regions of countries with reliable data. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), who look across U.S.
states, and Moretti (1998), who looks across U.S. citites, provide good starts down this path,
although they reach conflicting conclusions regarding any deviation between the social and private
returns to education.45
References
Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua D. Angrist, "How Large are the Social Returns to Education?
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws," mimeo, MIT, September 17, 1999.
Aghion, Phillippe, and Howitt, Peter. Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998.
Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens and Alan B. Krueger, "Jackknife Instrumental
Variables Estimation," Journal of Anolied Econometrics, January-February 1999.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Krueger, "Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect
Schooling and Earnings?," Ouarterlv Journal of Economics, 106(4), November 1991,pp. 979-
1014.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Krueger, "Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," in
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, (Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1999).
Ashenfelter, Orley A., Colm Hannon and Hessel Oosterbeek, mimeo., "Empirical Estimation of
the Schooling/Earnings Relationship —AReview," forthcoming Labour Economics, 1999.
Ashenfelter, Orley A. and Alan B. Krueger, "Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling
from aNew Sample of Twins," American Economic Review, 84(5), December 1994,pp. 1157-
73.
Barnett, W. Steven, 'Benefits of Compensatory Preschool Education," Journal of Human
Resources 27(2), Spring 1992, pp. 279-312.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).
Barro, Robert J., Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Emnirical Study, Lionel
Robbins Lectures, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), December 1993,pp. 363-394.
Behnnan, Jere and Mark Rosensweig, "Caveat Emptor: Cross-country Data on Education and the
Labor Force," Journal of Develoument Economics 44, June 1994,pp. 147-72.
Behrman, Jere and Mark Rosensweig, "Adult Schooling Stocks: Comparisons Among Aggregate
Data Series," mimeo., University of Pennsylvania, July 19, 1993.46
Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M., "The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development: Evidence
from Aggregate Cross-Country Data", Journal of Monetary Economics, 34(2), October 1994,
pp.143-74.
Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow, "Does Schooling Cause Growth or the Other Way Around?"
NBER Working Paper 6393, 1998.
Blaug, Mark, Richard Layard and Maureen Woodhall, The Causes of Graduate Unemployment
in India (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1969).
Blomstrom, M., R. Lipsey, and M. Zejan, "Is Fixed Investment the Key to Economic Growth,"
NBER Working Paper No. 4436, Cambridge, MA, 1993.
Bound, John, David Jaeger and Regina Baker, "Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation
When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is
Weak," Journal of the American statistical Association, 90(430), June 1995,pp. 443-50.
Card, David, "Using Geographic Variation in College Proximity to Estimate the Returns to
Schooling," in L. Christofides, E. Grant, and R. Swidinsky, eds., Asoects of Labor Market
Behaviour: Essays in Honour of John Vanderkamp (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995a), pp. 201-222.
Card, David, "Earnings, Schooling and Ability Revisited," in Solomon W. Polachek, cd.,
Research in Labor Economics. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995b).
Card, David, "The Causal Effect of Schooling on Earnings," Orley Ashenfelter and David Card,
cds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999).
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger, "Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the
Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States", Journal of Politicaleconomy. 100(1),
February 1992, pp. 1-40.
Chamberlain, Gary and Guido Imbens, "Hierarchical Bayes Models with Many Instrumental
Variables," mimeo., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, August 1996.
Dale, Stacy and Alan Krueger, "The Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An
Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables," Princeton University, Industrial
Relation Section, Working Paper No. 409, 1998.
Donald, Steven and Whitney Newey, "Choosing the Number of Instruments," MIT, mimeo.,
1997.
Duflo, Esther, "Evaluating the Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of a School47
Construction Program: An Analysis of the Indonesian experience," mimeo., MIT, February 1998.
Entwisle, Doris, Karl Alexander, Linda Olson, Children. Schools and Inequality (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1997).
Freeman, Richard and Lawrence Katz, eds., Differences and changes in wage structures (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp.25-66.
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz, "The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity,"
NBER Working Paper No. 5657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Gollin, Douglas, "Getting Income Shares Right: Self Employment, Unincorporated Enterprise,
And the Cobb-Douglas Hypothesis," mimeo., Williams College, June 1998.
Gorseline, Donald E., The Effect of Schooling Upon Income (Bloomington, IN: University of
Indiana Press, 1932).
Griliehes, Zvi, "Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Some Econometric Problems,"
Econometrica, 45(1), January 1977, pp. 1-22.
Griliches, Zvi, "Economic Data Issues," in Zvi Griliches and Michael D. Intriligator, eds.,
Handbook of Econometrics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986).
Griliches, Zvi and William M. Mason "Education, Income, and Ability," Journal of Political
Economy, 80(3), Part II, May/June 1972, pp. 574-S 103.
Hall, Robert and Charles I. Jones, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much MoreOutput per
Worker than Others?" Forthcoming, Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 1998.
Harberger, Arnold, "Investment in Men Versus Investment in Machines: The Case of India," in
C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, eds., Education and EconomicDevelopment
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 11-50.
Harbison, Frederick, and Charles Myers, eds., Manpower and Education (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1965), p. xi.
Harmon, Coim and Ian Walker, "Estimates of the Economic return to Schooling for the United
kingdom," American Economic Review, 85(5), December 1995,pp. 1278-86.
Heckrnan, James and Peter Kienow, "Human Capital Policy," mimeo., University ofChicago, December 1997.
Inglehart, Ronald, Codebook for World Values Survey (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social48
Research 1994).
Kienow, Peter, and Andrés Rodriguez-Clare, "The Neoclassical Revival in Growth Economics:
Has it Gone Too Far?' In Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics
Annual (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 73-103.
Krueger, Alan B., 'Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions," Onarterly
Journal of Economics, May 1999.
Krueger, Alan B. and Mikael Lindahi, "Education for Growth in Sweden and the World,"
Swedish Economic Policy Review, Autumn 1999, vol. 6, pp. 289-339.
Krueger, Alan B. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke "A Comparative Analysis of East and West German
Labor Markets: Before and After Unification," in Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz, eds.,
Differences and changes in wage structures. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1995), pp. 405-45.
Kyriacou, G., "Level and Growth Effects of Human Capital", Working Paper, C.V. Starr Center,
New York University. 1991.
Lang, Kevin "Ability Bias, Discount Rate Bias and the Return to Education," mimeo., Boston
University, Department of Economics, 1993.
Lee, Kevin, M. flashem Pesaran, and Ron Smith, "Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach --
AComment," Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1), February 1998, pp. 3 19-324.
Levy, Frank and Richard Murnane, "Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review
of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations," Journal of Economic Literature (30)(3),
September 1992, pp. 1333-81.
Lewis, W. Arthur, "Secondary Education and Economic Structure," Social and Economic
Studies, 10(2), 1964, pp. 219-232. Reprinted in Mark Gersovitz, ed., Selected Economic
Writin2s of W. Arthur Lewis (New York: New York University Press, 1983),pp. 509-522.
Lucas, Robert, "On the Mechanics of Economic Development," Journal of Monetary Economics
220), July 1988, pp. 3-42.
Machiup, Fritz, Education and Economic Growth (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1970).
Mankiw, N.G., "Comment," in Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotemberg, eds., NBER
Macroeconomics Annual (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997),pp. 103-106.49
Mankiw, N.G., David Romer andD.M.Weil, "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic
Growth," Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), May 1992, pp.407-43 7.
Miller,Herman P., Income of the American Peonle (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1955).
Mincer, Jacob, Schooling. Earnings. and Exoerience (New York: Columbia University Press,
1974).
Moretti, Enrico, "Social returns to Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from
Cities," mimeo, UC Berkeley, December 1998.
Murphy, Kevin M and Finis Welch, "Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles," Journal of Labor
Economics, 8(2), April 1990, Pp. 202-229.
Nelson, R. and E. Phelps, "Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and Economic
Growth," American Economic Review, 560, 1966, pp. 69-75.
O'Neill, Donal. "Education and Income Growth: Implications for Cross-Country Inequality,"
Journal of Political Economy, 103, no 6, December 1995,pp. 1289-1301.
Park, Jin Huem. "Returns to Schooling: A Peculiar Deviation from Linearity," Princeton
University, Industrial Relations Section Working Paper No. 335, October 1994.
Pritchett, Lant. "Where Has All the Education Gone?" Policy Research Working Paper No.
1581, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., June 1997.
Psacharopoulos, G., "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update", World
Development, 22(9), September 1994, pp.1325-43.
Rivkin, Steven Eric Hanushek, and John Kain, "Teachers, Schools and Academic Achievement,"
mimeo., University of Rochester, July 1998.
Romer, Paul, "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, 89 (
5), Part 2, October 1990, pp. S71-S102.
Rosen, Sherwin, "Human Capital: A Survey of Empirical Research," in R. Ehrenberg, ed.,
Research in Labor Economics, (Greenwich, Conn, JAI Press, vol. 1.1977).
Smith, James. "Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation Between Health and
SES," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1999.
Spence, A. Michael, "Job Market Signaling," Ouarterlv Journal of Economics,87(3), August50
1973, pp. 355-74.
Staiger, Douglas and James H. Stock, "Instrumental Variables Regressions with Weak
Instruments," Ecpnometrica, 65(3), May 1997, pp. 557-86.
Summers, R. and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of
International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Ouarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), May 1991,pp.
327-368.
Summers, Anita A. and Barbara L. Wolfe, "Do Schools Make a Difference?" American
Economic Review, 67(4) Sept. 1977, pp. 639-52.
Temple, Jonathan, "The New growth Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVII,
March 1999a,pp. 112-156.
Temple, Jonathan, "A Positive Effect of Human Capital on Growth," Economic Letters, October
1999b, 65(1), pp. 13 1-34.
Topel, Robert, "Labor Markets and Economic Growth," in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card,
eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999).
UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook. 1967 (Paris: UNESCO, 1967).
Walsh, J.R. "Capital Concept Applied to Man," Ouarterlv Journal of Economics, XLIX,
Februrary 1935, pp. 255-85.
Welch, F., "Education in Production," Journal of Political Economy, 78(1), Jan.-Feb.1970,pp. 35-59.
Willis, Robert J., "Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human Capital
Earnings Functions," in Ashenfelter, Orley A. and Richard Layard, eds. Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986).
Wolfe, Dael and Joseph G. Smith, "The Occupational Value of Education for Superior High-
School Graduates," Journal of Higher Education, 27(4), April 1956, 201-232.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo, "On Using Linear Regressions in Welfare Economics," Journal of Business
and Economics Statistics, 14, 1996, pp. 478-86.Data Appendix
The second wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) was conducted in 42 countries between
1990 and 1993. The sampled countries represented almost 70% of the worldpopulation,
including several countries where micro data normally are unavailable. Thesurvey was designed
by the World Values Study Group (1994), and conducted by localsurvey organizations (mainly
Gallup) in each of the surveyed countries. Inmost countries, a national random sample of adults
(over age 18) was surveyed. For 12 of the countries in our sample (Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, India, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, West Germany and U.K.),
sampling weights were available to make the survey representative of the country's population;
the other samples are self-weighting. A feature of thesurvey is that the questiolmaire was
designed to be similar in all countries to facilitate comparisons across countries. Thereare,
however, drawbacks to using the V/VS for our purposes. The primarypurpose of the WVS was
to compare values and norms across different societies. Although questions about income and
education were included, they appear to have been a lower priority than the normativequestions.
For example, family income was collected as a categorical variable in tenranges, and some
countries failed to report the currency values associated with theranges. We were able to derive
comparable data from the WVS on mean years of schooling for 34 countries and on mean
income for 17 countries.
Mean years of schooling is calculated from question V356 in the WVS, whichasked, "At what
age did you or will you complete your formal education, either at school or at an institution of
higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships." The variable is typically bottom coded at 12
years of age and top coded at 21 years of age. Although there are some benefits of formulating
the question this way, for our purposes it also creates some problems. First,we do not know the
age at which respondents started their education. For this reason we have used data from
UNESCO (1967) on the typical school starting age in eachcountry. Second, the top and bottom
coding is potentially a problem. For almost one third of the countries (Austria, Brazil, Denmark,
India, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey), however,a question was
asked concerning formal educational attainment. Since, as mentioned above,one of the benefits
with the V/VS is that the same questions are asked in all the countries,we used this variable
only to solve the bottom and top coding problem.' We have coded illiterate/noschooling as 0
years of schooling and incomplete primary schooling as 3 years. In the two countries where
graduate studies is a separate category, we have set this to 19. For the countries in which the
educational attainment variable does not exist, we setyears of schooling for those in the bottom-
'For South Korea and Switzerland, however, we exclusively used this variable to deriveyears of schooling
because the question about school leaving age is not asked in these countries ForTurkey, school leaving age is only
coded as three possible ages, so we use both the educational attainment and schoolleaving age variable to derive
years of schooling.coded category equal to the midpoint of 0 and the bottom codedyears of schooling.2 Similarly,
we set years of schooling for the highest category equal to the midpoint of 18 and thetop coded
years of schooling.
As mentioned, the family income variable in WVS is reported in 10categories. We coded income
as the midpoints of the range in each category. This variable is also censored from below and above.
For simplicity, we set income for those who were bottom coded at themidpoint between zero and
the lower income limit. We handled top coding by fitting a Pareto distributionto family income
above each country's median income. Assuming that this distributioncorrectly characterizes the
highest category, we calculated the mean of the censored distribution. We converted thefamily
income variable to a dollar-value equivalent by multiplying thefamily income variable in each
country by the ratio of the purchasing power parity in dollars to the corresponding localcurrency
exchange, using Summers and Heston's (1991) data.
The logarithm of mean income per capita was calculated as thelogarithm of the sum of family
income in common currency divided by the total number of individuals in all householdsin the
sample. The total number of individuals in each household is calculated as the sum of the number
of chilthen living at home and the number of adultspresent. (Two adults were assumed to be present
if the respondent was married; otherwise, one adult was assumed to bepresent.) Appendix Table
A2 reports the weighted mean years of schooling and log incomeper capita derived from the WVS.
The weights for these calculations were the sampling weightsreported in the WVS. The sample size
used to calculate mean schooling is also reported.
2
East and West Germany the bottom code was 14, and for Finlanditwas 15. Because schoolstartage was 7 in Finland and East Germany, and 6 in West Germany, we setyears of schooling equal to 6 in West Gennany
and Finland and 5 in East Germany for those who were bottom coded.Notes: Sample size is 68. A superscript BL refers to the Barro-Lee data anda superscript
K refers to the Kyriacou data. The subscript indicates theyear. Unlike the other tables, the
change in schooling is not annualized.
Appendix Table Al: Correlation and Covariance Matrices for Barro-Lee and Kyriacou


















































-0.50 1.02 0.30 1.52Appendix Table A2: International Data Derived from the World Values
Survey
Mean years Log family Survey Sample
Country of schooling income per capitaYear Size
(Std. deviation)
Argentina 10.23 (4.88) -- 1991 766
Austria 8.69 (4.88) 8.78 1990 1,296
Belgium 11.53 (3.29) 8.92 1990 2,328
Bulgaria 11.29 (3.83) -- 1990 877
Brazil 4.04 (3.04) -- 1991-92 1,154
Canada 12.60 (3.19) 9.48 1990 1,483
Czechoslovakia 11.78 (2.86) -- 1990 1,190
Chile 10.48 (4.37) 7.81 1990 1,137
China 10.32 (3.51) -- 1990 745
Denmark 12.50 (3.66) 1990 862
East Germany 9.12 (3.90) -- 1990 1,175
Finland 12.61 (3.81) 9.00 1990 534
France 11.12 (3.62) -- 1990 830
Hungary 9.79 (3.57) 7.91 1990 895
Iceland 12.16 (3.74) -- 1990 575
Ireland 10.20 (2.81) -- 1990 847
India 2.97 (4.48) 7.07 1990 1,908
Italy 7.88 (4.90) 9.02 1990 1,616
Japan 12.29 (2.85) 9.10 1990 855
Mexico 8.44 (5.47) -- 1990 835
Netherlands 11.89 (3.65) 9.17 1990 876
Norway 13.43 (4.46) 9.20 1990 1,063
Poland 10.11 (3.56) -- 1989 803
Portugal 6.12 (4.79) 8.41 1990 823
Romania 10.50 (4.36) -- 1993 933
Russia 12.35 (3.67) 1991 1,551
Spain 8.61 (4.49) 8.24 1990 2,991
South Korea 12.00 (3.58) -- 1990 1,040
Sweden 12.79 (3.40) 1990 848
Switzerland 8.63 (2.61) -- 1988-89 1,154
Turkey 6.13 (4.65) 8.09 1990-91 805
U.K.(excl. N.I.) 11.20 (2.50) 9.17 1990 1,288
USA 13.26 (2.96) 9.49 1990 1,477
West Germany 9.78 (3.34) 9.19 1990 1,770
Note: Sample size pertains to the number of observations used to calculateyears of
schooling.Table 1: Replication and Extension of Benhabib andSpiegel (1994)
Dependent Variable: Annualized Change in Log GDP, 1965-85
Variable
Lo Schooling Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















































R2 .694 .720 .291 .688 .726 .271
Notes: All change variables were divided by 20, including the dependent variable.Sample
size is 78 countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. Allequations also include an
intercept. S is Kyriacou's measure of schooling in 1965; A Log S is the change inlog
schooling between 1965 and 1985, divided by 20; and Y is GDPper capita in 1965.
Mean of the dependent variable is .039; standard deviation ofdependent variable is .020.Table 2. Reliability of Various Measures of Years of Schooling
A. Estimated Reliability Ratios for Barro-Lee and Kyriacou Data
Reliability of Reliability of
Barro-Lee DataKyriacou Data
Average years of .851 .964
schooling, 1965 (.049) (.055)
Average years of .773 .966
schooling, 1985 (.055) (.069)
Change in years of .577 .195
schooling, 1965-85 (.199) (.067)
B. Estimated Reliability Ratios for Barro-Lee and World Values Survey Data
Reliability of Reliablity
Barro-Lee Dataof WVS Data
Average years of .903 .727





Notes: The estimated reliability ratios are the slope coefficients froma bivariate regression
of one measure of schooling on the other. For example, the .851entry in the first row is the
slope coefficient from a regression in which the dependent variable is Kyriacou'sschooling
variable and the independent variable is Barro-Lee's schooling variable. The .964 ratio inthe
second column is estimated from the reverse regression. In panel B, thereliability ratios are
estimated by comparing the Barro-Lee and WVS data. In the WVS dataset, secondary and
higher schooling is defined as years of schooling attained after8 years of schooling.
Samplesize for panel A is 68 countries. Sample size for panel B is 34 countries. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.Table 3: The Effect of Schooling on Growth
Dependent Variable: Annualized Change in Log GDP per Capita
5-year changes 1 0-year changes 20-year changes











































R2 .197 .161 .207 .242 .229 .284 .184 .103 .281
N 607 607 607 292 292 292 97
Notes: First six columns include time dummies. Equations were estimated by OLS. The standarderrors in the first six columns allow
for correlated errors for the same country in different time periods. Maximum number of countries is 110. Columns 1-3 consist of
changes for 1960-65, 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90. Columns 4-6 consist of changes for 1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-90.
Columns 7-9 consist of changes for 1965-8 5. Log '4' and St-i are the log GDPper capita and level of schooling in the initial year of
each period. AS is the change in schooling between t-1 and t divided by the number ofyears in the period. Data are from Summers
and 1-lestonandBarro and Lee. Mean (and standard deviation) of annualized per capita GDP growth is .021 (.03 3) for columns1-3,
.022 (.026) for columns 4-6, and .022 (.020) for columns 7-9.Table 4: The Effect of Measurement Error on the Sum of Schooling Coefficients












































.0030 .0052 .0028 .0047 .0041 .0067 ---
12 .197 .207 .272 .284 .159 .281 ---
N 607 607 292 292 97 97 67 67
Notes: All regressions also include time dummies and an intercept. The standard errors in the first four columns allow for correlated errors within
countries over time. The time periods covered are the same as in Table 4. Tn columns 7 and 8, Kyriacou's education data are used asinstruments
for Barro and Lee's education data. All other columns only use Barro and Lee's education data. See text for description of the measurement error
correction. Mean (and standard deviation) of dependent variable are .021 (.033) for columns 1-2, .022 (.026) for columns 3-4, .022 (.020) for
columns 5-6, and .019 (.0 19) for columns 7-8.Table 5: The Effect of Schooling and Capital on Economic Growth
Dependent Variable: Annualized Change in Log GDPper Capita, 1965-85
OLS IV














































R2 .63 .76 .58 .12 .55
Sample Size 92 92 92 92 66
Notes: Change variables have been divided by the number ofyears spanned
by the change (20 years for schooling and log GDP, 25 years for capital).
Schooling data used in the regressions are from Barro and Lee. The
instrumental variables model in column 6 uses Kyriacou's schooling dataas
excluded instruments for the level and change in Barro-Lee's schooling
variables. Capital data are from Klenow and Rodriguez-Dare (1997), and
pertain to 1960-85. The coefficient on the change in log capital in column 4 is
constrained to equal .35, which is roughly capitals share.Table 6: Mean Estimates from a Random coefficient Specification





















p-value --- .000 --- .000










p-value --- .0000 --- .0000
R2 .190 .469 .242 .658
Notes: All regressions control for initial Log GDP per capita and time dummies. The number of countries is 110 for the5-year
change equations and 108 for the 10-year change models. The p-value is for test of equality of country-specific education
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Linear and Unrestricted Schooling-GDP Growth
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B. World Distribution of Education




A. OLS Weighting Function
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